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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & CRIMINAL LAW-THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT-THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY: A PREMATURE DECISION
OVER TEENAGE IMMATURITY? Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
I. INTRODUCTION
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."'
The final clause of the Eighth Amendment is the source of this nation's
prohibition on unconstitutional punishments.2 The provision's meaning is
itself a matter of debate because the Framers left little evidence of why they
included it.3 In the latter half of the 1800s, the United States Supreme
Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence began with questions about the
method of death.4 Later, the Court divined a dynamic rule for interpreting
the Eighth Amendment from the "evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society."5 This well-settled rule is meant to com-
pensate for the provision's inherent vagueness and the lack of conclusive
evidence from the historical record regarding its meaning.6 The alternative,
the Court concluded, was that the clause would be limited to protecting the
citizenry from the tortuous and barbaric practices of eighteenth-century Eng-
land; thus, the provision would be rendered moot as time marched on and
society progressed.7 Today, the Court's evolving-standards test has two
steps: The Court (1) looks at objective indicia of societal consensus against
a particular practice and (2) ultimately uses its independent judgment to
analyze whether the punishment is proportional to the offender's mental
state and category of crime.' There is tension within the Court, however,
because some members believe that the evolving-standards jurisprudence is
mistaken, and they fervently reject a proportionality analysis.9
The United States has a long history of executing juveniles, and, in
Roper v. Simmons," the Court concluded this history." In Roper, the Court
1. UNITED STATES CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
2. Id.
3. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 263 (1972) (per curiam); see infra Part III.B.2.
4. See infra Part III.B. 1.
5. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality); see infra Part III.B.2.
6. See infra Part III.B.2.
7. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910); see infra Part III.B.2.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. 543 U.S. 551 (2005); see infra Part IV.
11. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
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held that the execution of offenders who were under eighteen at the time of
their crime is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of
"cruel and unusual punishments."' 2
This note begins with the facts of Roper,3 and then it examines the his-
tory of the juvenile death penalty since colonial times. 4 Also, the note ad-
dresses the origins of the Court's evolving-standards doctrine. 5 Next, the
note examines the cases that preceded the Roper decision by focusing on
those cases in which the Court was asked to decide if the evolving standards
of decency prohibited the execution of two different classes of offenders: the
mentally retarded and juveniles. 16 After an analysis of the Roper decision,
the note concludes with a discussion regarding whether the evolving-
standards test is an unprincipled method, or whether it is the best way to
approach these types of Eighth Amendment claims. 7
II. FACTS
A. The Crime
In early September 1993, seventeen-year-old Christopher Simmons
talked with fifteen-year-old Charlie Benjamin and sixteen-year-old John
Tessmer about committing burglary and murder. 8 The three boys often went
to hang out at their friend Brian Moomey's house, a twenty-nine-year-old
convicted felon who threw nightly parties attended by local teenagers. 9 At
one of these parties, Moomey overheard Simmons describing to Benjamin
and Tessmer a plan to burglarize a house and kill the occupants.20 Moomey
also heard Simmons assure his friends that "they could do it and not get
charged for it because they are juveniles."'"
At 2:00 a.m. on September 8, 1993, Simmons and Benjamin left
Moomey's, without Tessmer, and went to burglarize the home of Shirley
Crook.22 The two boys found an open back window, unlocked the door, and
entered the house.23 As they moved through the house, Simmons turned on a
12. Id.
13. See infra Part Ill.
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See infra Part III.B.
16. See infra Part III.C.
17. See infra Parts IV-V.
18. State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
19. Brief for Respondent at 3, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d at 169.
23. Id.
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hallway light, which awoke Mrs. Crook.24 Simmons entered the bedroom
and recognized Mrs. Crook from a previous automobile accident, which
involved them both.25
Next, Simmons ordered Mrs. Crook to the floor, and when she did not
comply, Simmons and Benjamin forced her.26 Simmons bound her hands
behind her back with duct tape, taped her mouth and eyes shut, and marched
her out of the house to her minivan.27 Simmons drove the van to a state park
in an adjoining county.28 Once at the park, Simmons drove to a railroad
bridge that spanned a river and unloaded Mrs. Crook.29 She had managed to
free her hands and remove some of the duct tape from her face.3" Simmons
and Benjamin re-bound Mrs. Crook's hands and feet by using duct tape, the
strap from her purse, the belt from her bathrobe, and some wire found on the
railroad trestle.3' Next, they walked her to the trestle, hog-tied her hands and
feet, and completely wrapped her face with duct tape.32 Mrs. Crook was
alive and conscious as Simmons pushed her into the river below.33
Later that day at Moomey's house, Simmons bragged that he killed a
woman "because the bitch seen my face. 3 4 Meanwhile, Shirley's husband,
Steven Crook, returned from a trip to find that his wife had not gone to
work. 35 Mr. Crook filed a missing person report after his wife failed to ap-
pear that night.36
On September 9, 1993, two fishermen found a dead body floating in
the Meramec River in St. Louis County, Missouri.37 The victim's head was
covered up, and the body's arms and legs were bound by duct tape and elec-
trical wire.38 The medical examiner later identified the body as Shirley
Crook, determined that drowning caused her death, and noted that she was
alive when she hit the water.39
The next day, the police received information that Simmons was in-
volved in the crime.40 They arrested Simmons at school, took him in for
















40. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d at 170.
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questioning, and read him his Miranda rights.4' Simmons waived his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and his Fifth Amendment right to remain si-
lent, and he cooperated with the investigators. 42 After two hours of question-
ing, Simmons confessed to the burglary and murder, agreed to a videotaped




The State charged Simmons with first-degree murder, burglary, kid-
napping, and theft.' At trial, Tessmer and Moomey testified against Sim-
mons.45 Their testimony detailed Simmons's plan to commit burglary and
murder and also detailed his incriminating comments to Moomey after the
crime."
The defense presented no witnesses at trial.47 In the state's closing ar-
gument, the prosecutor asked the jury not to let Simmons "use his age as a
shield to protect him., 4' The jury found Simmons guilty of all charges and
recommended the death sentence.49 At sentencing, the state offered the tes-
timony of Mrs. Crook's family, and the defense presented evidence that
Simmons had no previous criminal charges or adjudications.5" In a closing
argument, defense counsel referred to this testimony, the lack of any crimi-
nal history, and Simmons's age as mitigating factors against imposition of
the death penalty.5"
The state responded by turning Simmons's age against him by stating
the following: "Seventeen years old. Isn't that scary? Doesn't that scare
you? Mitigating? Quite the contrary[,] I submit. Quite the contrary." 2 The
court instructed the jury to consider the mitigating factors of Simmons's





45. Brief for Respondent, supra note 19, at 3-4.
46. Id. at 4.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d at 170.
50. Brief for Respondent, supra note 19, at 4. Defense counsel also presented the testi-
mony of Simmons's parents, half-brothers, and friends, who all testified to having a loving
relationship with Simmons. Id.
51. Id.
52. Brief for Respondent, supra note 19, at 4-5.
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family's testimony on his behalf.53 The jury sentenced Simmons to death
and found three aggravating factors: (1) the murder "was committed for the
purpose of receiving money;" (2) the murder "was committed for the pur-
pose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest of the de-
fendant;" and (3) the murder was "outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible,
and inhuman" because Simmons bound Mrs. Crook before he killed her. 4
2. Hearing on Motion for Post-Conviction Relief
Simmons filed a motion in the trial court for post-conviction relief."
He claimed that his conviction should be set aside due to ineffective assis-
tance of counsel at both the guilt and sentencing phases because trial coun-
sel chose not to introduce mitigating evidence of Dr. Daniel Cuneo's psy-
chological evaluation of Simmons before trial." At an evidentiary hearing
on the motion, Simmons introduced for the first time the results of Dr. Cu-
neo's evaluation and the results of a new evaluation by Dr. Robert Smith, a
clinical psychologist Simmons's post-conviction counsel contacted." These
experts testified regarding Simmons's developmental history, maturity level
at the time of the crime, and his ability to assist counsel in his defense. Dr.
Smith conducted a more thorough evaluation than Dr. Cuneo, and Dr. Smith
concluded that Simmons's immaturity, history of childhood abuse, and his-
tory of drug and alcohol abuse, evidenced a personality disorder 9.5 Dr. Smith
ultimately diagnosed Simmons with a schizo-typal personality disorder,'
53. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 558 (2005).
54. Brief for Respondent, supra note 19, at 5.
55. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d at 170.
56. Brief for Respondent, supra note 19, at 5.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 5-6.
59. Id. at 8.
60. The diagnostic criteria for Schizotypal Personality Disorder is defined as follows:
A pervasive pattern of social and interpersonal deficits marked by acute discom-
fort with, and reduced capacity for, close relationships[,] as well as by cognitive
or perceptual distortions and eccentricities of behavior, beginning by early adult-
hood and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the
following: (1) ideas of reference (excluding delusions of reference); (2) odd be-
liefs or magical thinking that influences behavior and is inconsistent with subcul-
tural norms (e.g., superstitiousness, belief in clairvoyance, telepathy[,] or "sixth
sense"; in children and adolescents, bizarre fantasies or preoccupations); (3) un-
usual perceptual experiences, including bodily illusions; (4) odd thinking and
speech; (5) suspiciousness or paranoid ideation; (6) inappropriate or constricted
affect; (7) behavior or appearance that is odd, eccentric, or peculiar; (8) lack of
close friends or confidants other than first-degree relatives; (9) excessive social
anxiety that does not diminish with familiarity and tends to be associated with
paranoid fears rather than negative judgments about self.
2006]
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believing that Simmons's impairments affected his ability to assist counsel.6
Furthermore, Simmons's trial counsel testified at the hearing that Simmons
initially denied being abused by his stepfather and denied ever abusing
drugs and alcohol, and, more importantly, Simmons never seemed to under-
stand that he was facing the death penalty.62 Despite this testimony, the trial
court denied the motion, finding no merit in Simmons's claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.63
3. Missouri Supreme Court and Federal Petition for a Writ of Ha-
beas Corpus
Simmons appealed his conviction, sentence, and denial of post-
conviction relief to the Missouri Supreme Court,' The court affirmed on all
points and determined that defense counsel's choice to forgo Dr. Cuneo's
testimony at trial was a well-informed, strategic decision.65 The United
States Supreme Court denied review.66 Then, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed Simmons's petition for
a writ of habeas corpus, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.67
The United States Supreme Court denied review a second time.68 At this
point in the appellate process, Simmons raised no Eighth Amendment issues
regarding the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty.
4. State Habeas Corpus
After the United States Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia,6
Simmons sought a writ of habeas corpus from the Missouri Supreme
Court.70 Simmons argued that to execute him for a crime committed while
he was seventeen would be cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.7' Because of Stanford v. Kentucky,72 Simmons did not argue
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 645
(4th ed. 1994).
61. Brief for Respondent, supra note 19, at 8.
62. Id. at 8-9.
63. Id. at9.
64. State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Mo. 1997).
65. Id. at 184.
66. Simmons v. Missouri, 522 U.S. 953 (1997).
67. Simmons v. Bowersox, 235 F.3d 1124 (8th Cir. 2001).
68. Simmons v. Leubbers, 534 U.S. 924 (2001).
69. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execu-
tion of the mentally retarded); see infra note 258.
70. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
71. Id. at 399.
72. 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the
execution of sixteen and seventeen-year-old offenders); see infra Part 11I.C. L .b.
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that his punishment was unconstitutional in his first appeal to this court.73 In
light of Atkins's national census against execution of the mentally retarded,
however, Simmons saw a new avenue for appeal.74 He asked the Missouri
Supreme Court to find that a similar consensus had developed, since Stan-
ford, against the death penalty for juveniles.75
In order to determine whether the death penalty for juveniles was un-
constitutional, the Missouri Supreme Court reviewed the Court's jurispru-
dence regarding the death penalty for juvenile and mentally retarded offend-
ers.76 The court began its analysis by reasoning that it must conduct a cur-
rent analysis for any evolving, national consensus against the juvenile death
penalty.77 In other words, the court felt that it was not bound by the 1989
evolving-standards analysis from the Supreme Court's decision in Stan-
ford.78 Rather, the court observed that it "clearly ha[d] the authority and the
obligation to determine the case before it based on current-2003-
standards of decency."'7 9
After the Missouri Supreme Court reviewed the Supreme Court's
death-penalty jurisprudence for juveniles and the mentally retarded, it noted
the Court's near-identical approach to each class of offenders. 8' The state
supreme court decided that it would follow the approach set out in Atkins to
decide whether a national consensus had emerged against the juvenile death
penalty.8 First, the court noted that Atkins discovered a national consensus
against the death penalty for the mentally retarded by observing that, since
the Court decided Penry v. Lynaugh,82 sixteen state legislatures enacted leg-
islation barring the death penalty for the mentally retarded.83 The court
added these states to the two states that already barred the practice in
Penry's era and the twelve states that prohibited the death penalty outright
for a total of thirty states against the death penalty for the mentally re-
tarded.84 Since Stanford, the court discovered that five more states had
banned the penalty for juveniles, bringing the total to sixteen, two fewer
than in Atkins.85 Thus, when it added the twelve abolition states to the equa-
73. See infra Part II.B.3.
74. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 399.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 400; see infra Part III.C.





82. 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (holding that the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit the execu-
tion of the mentally retarded); see infra note 258.





tion, the court concluded that twenty-eight states were against the juvenile
death penalty.86 Furthermore, since Stanford, the court observed that no
states had lowered the minimum age for execution.87
The court emphasized Atkins's observation that only five individuals
known to be mentally retarded had been executed in the fourteen years since
Penry.88 Similarly, the court found that only six juvenile offenders had been
executed since Stanford and that only 22 out of the 366 American juvenile
executions in history had occurred since 1973 .89 The court also observed that
the vast majority of juvenile death sentences were reversed on a variety of
grounds.90 Accordingly, the court concluded that the practice of sentencing
and executing juveniles had become an unusual practice.91
Next, the court noted the sizeable opposition to the juvenile death pen-
alty by many professional, social, and religious organizations.92 It observed
that, although Stanford largely rejected the importance of these groups, At-
kins marked a return to consideration of this evidence in the evolving-
standards analysis.93 Therefore, the views of these organizations, as well as
the views of the international community, persuaded the court.94
Finally, the court conducted an independent examination of the retribu-
tive and deterrent goals that the death penalty was meant to serve. 95 As for
retribution, the court followed Atkins and reasoned that it was necessary to
categorically exclude juveniles from the death penalty because, as a class,
they are less developed mentally, less mature, less able to reason, and, there-
fore, less culpable, generally.96 Similarly, the deterrent goals were not served
because juveniles generally do not think about the consequences of their
actions.97 Also, the court observed that the sentencing jury in the present
case highlighted the dangers of wrongful execution of these offenders be-
cause, even though Missouri required youth to be a mitigating factor, the
prosecutor used Simmons's age as an aggravating factor.98 The Missouri
Supreme Court concluded that "the Supreme Court of the United States
would hold that the execution of persons for crimes committed when they
were under [eighteen] years of age violates the 'evolving standards of de-
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 409.
89. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 409.
90. Id.




95. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 411.
96. Id. at 412.
97. Id. at 413.
98. Id.
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cency that mark the progress of a maturing society,' and is prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment."99
III. BACKGROUND
The United States has executed hundreds of juveniles in its history.'0°
Many offenders were executed for murder; however, a substantial number of
offenders were executed for other crimes that did not result in death, includ-
ing arson, assault, battery, attempted rape, bestiality, and robbery.' The
United States Supreme Court did not squarely address the constitutionality
of the juvenile death penalty until 1988 in Thompson v. Oklahoma."'2 In
Thompson, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execu-
tion of juvenile offenders who were under the age of sixteen at the time of
their capital crime.'0 3 Eighteen years later, after the decision in Roper v.
Simmons,"° the Court interpreted the Eighth Amendment to prohibit the
execution of any juvenile who was under eighteen at the time of the of-
fender's capital crime.'0 5 This section briefly addresses the history of the
juvenile death penalty since colonial times.0 6 Then, the section highlights
the Court's early approach to Eighth Amendment claims and lays out the
doctrine underlying how the Court analyzes Eighth Amendment claims to-
day.10 7 Finally, the section discusses what the Court did in the eighteen in-
tervening years between Thompson and Roper. '08
A. Early History of the Juvenile Death Penalty
The United States's history of capital punishment for juvenile offend-
ers has its origins in the English common law in which the penalty for this
class of offenders was commonplace, but it was not without standards.0 9
Documentation of early Anglo-Saxon criminal sentencing dates back to at
99. Id.
100. VICTOR L. STREIB, THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY TODAY: DEATH SENTENCES AND
EXECUTIONS FOR JUVENILE CRIMES 4 (2005), http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/
documents/juvdeath.pdf [hereinafter JUVENILE DEATH STATISTICS].
101. VICTOR L. STREIB, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES 62 (1987) [hereinafter Streib
Treatise].
102. 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality); see infra Part III.C.l.a.
103. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838.
104. 543 U.S. 551 (2005); see infra Part IV.
105. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
106. See infra Part III.A.
107. See infra Part III.B.
108. See infra Part III.C.
109. Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Children: The American Experience with Capital
Punishment for Crimes Committed While Under Age Eighteen, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 613, 614
(1983) [hereinafter Streib Article].
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least the fourteenth century, when the minimum age of criminal culpability
for homicide was set at age seven. 10 A child below age seven who commit-
ted a felony went "free of judgment because he knoweth not of good and
evil.""1.. From this period through the eighteenth century, there was a rebut-
table presumption that a child offender above the age of seven but below the
age of fourteen could not form the criminal intent required for a sentence of
death. 2 There was no rebuttable presumption for offenders over age four-
teen."3 The United States Supreme Court later accepted these views in In re
Gault.'"'
The first juvenile execution in American history occurred in 1642 when
a sixteen-year-old boy was executed in Plymouth Colony, Massachusetts.'
From this period to 1973, 344 juveniles were executed in the United
States,' 16 and at least thirty-nine of these offenders were between the ages of
ten and fifteen at the time of their capital crimes.' 17 In the modem era of
death-penalty jurisprudence, beginning with the landmark 1972 decision of
Furman v. Georgia,"8 twenty-two juvenile offenders have been executed." 9
Thus, from 1642 through February 2005, at least 366 juveniles were exe-
cuted out of about 20,000 confirmed executions in United States history.20
B. Early Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
1. Focusing on the Method of Death: Static Interpretation of the
Clause
Well into the nineteenth century, American society generally had no
moral or legal problems with capital punishment, 12' and the first constitu-
tional claims raised under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel
and unusual punishments" did not occur until 1878,122 when the Court de-
110. See A. W. G. Kean, The History of the Criminal Liability of Children, 53 L. Q. REv.
364, 366-67 (1937).
111. Id. at 364.
112. See id. at 36667; see also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES, *23-24.
113. Kean, supra note 110, at 369.
114. Streib Treatise, supra note 101, at 614-15 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16
(1967)).
115. Streib Treatise, supra note 101, at 55. Thomas Graunger was convicted of bestiality,
a capital offense, for sodomizing a horse and cow. Id.
116. JUVENILE DEATH STATISTICS, supra note 100, at 4.
117. Streib Article, supra note 109, at 619.
118. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
119. JUVENILE DEATH STATISTICS, supra note 100, at 4.
120. Id.
121. MICHAEL A. FOLEY, ARBITRARY AND CAPIucIous: THE SUPREME COURT, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE DEATH PENALTY 1-2 (Praeger Publishers 2003).
122. Id. at 1.
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cided Wilkerson v. Utah.123 In Wilkerson, the Court held that execution by
firing squad did not violate the Eighth Amendment. 124 The Court noted that,
at a minimum, the clause forbids torture, but the Court also observed-with
great foresight-that the provision would be difficult to define with preci-
sion. 125 Twelve years later, the Court held in In re Kemmler 26 that death by
electrocution was not a violation of the clause. 127 In these cases, the issue of
the death penalty itself was not before the Court. 28 The justices simply
weighed the constitutionality of these methods of execution against the
Court's definitions of torture and barbaric treatment, determining that death
by electrocution or firing squad was neither a "cruel" nor "unusual" method
of death. 29 The Court would later change course in Weems v. United
States,3 ° in which it reasoned that if the provision were interpreted simply
as a safeguard from torture and barbarism, then the clause would be "effec-
tively read out of the Bill of Rights" because no governmental authority
could justify such conduct in a free society. 13' Therefore, Wilkerson and
Kemmler represent a more static framework within which the Court could
analyze and apply the provision-an interpretative technique that would be
flatly rejected in Weems.
13
123. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
124. Id. at 136-37.
125. Id. at 135-36. The Court cited Blackstone for examples of torture and barbaric
methods:
[T]he prisoner was drawn or dragged to the place of execution, in treason; or
where he was embowelled alive, beheaded, and quartered, in high treason. Men-
tion is also made of public dissection in murder, and burning alive in treason
committed by a female .... Difficulty would attend the effort to define with ex-
actness the extent of the constitutional provision[,] which provides that cruel and
unusual punishments shall not be inflicted; but[,] it is safe to affirm that punish-
ments of torture ... and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are
forbidden by ... [the] Constitution.
Id.
126. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
127. Id. at 443-44. "Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death;
but[,] the punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as used in the
constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the
mere extinguishment of life." Id. at 447.
128. FOLEY, supra note 121, at 19.
129. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135; Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447.
130. 217 U.S. 349 (1910); see infra Part III.B.2.
131. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 265 (1972) (per curiam) (Brennan, J., concurring);
see Weems, 217 U.S. at 371.
132. William C. Heffernan, Constitutional Historicism: An Examination of the Eighth
Amendment Evolving Standards of Decency Test, 54 AM. U. L. REv. 1355, 1378-79 (2005).
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2. The Evolving Standards of Decency: Dynamic Interpretation of
the Clause
Weems v. United States was a non-capital case in which the offender
was convicted of falsifying records and was sentenced to twelve years of
hard labor with his wrists and ankles in chains. 33 The Court did not discover
a precise definition of "cruel and unusual punishments" in previous cases,
and it found little evidence regarding the Framers' intent in adopting the
phrase. 134 Nevertheless, the Court did uncover some debate about the provi-
sion from the Virginia and Pennsylvania ratifying conventions-history that
the Furman Court would later analyze in much greater detail.13 1 In Furman,
Justice William Brennan concluded that the Framers were concerned with
legislative power and that the provision was included to prevent the legisla-
ture from enacting outrageous criminal punishments.1 36 Justice Brennan,
however, also stated that it is impossible to know exactly what punishments
the Framers considered "cruel and unusual," but that the Framers certainly
meant to exclude torture. 137 Thus, the majority in Weems concluded that the
provision would be rendered moot if it were confined to the evils that had
existed in 1791 .138 Furthermore, the Court stated the following:
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.
Therefore[,] a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application
than the mischief[,] which gave it birth. [] Under any other rule a consti-
tution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in
efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little value, and be
converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas.
139
Thus, the Weems majority did not bind itself to an original-intent analy-
sis of this provision, nor did it feel constrained by the meager evidence of
the Framers' ideas in adopting the provision. 40 In arguing for the clause's
flexibility, Justice Joseph McKenna never concluded that the death penalty
was itself unconstitutional. 4 ' The opinion did, however, unmoor the phrase
from its early interpretations as strictly forbidding certain eighteenth-century
133. Weems, 217 U.S. at 357-58, 381.
134. Id. at 369.
135. Id at 371-72; Furman, 408 U.S. at 258-60 (Brennan, J., concurring) (analyzing in
detail the debates from the Virginia and Massachusetts ratifying conventions, as well as the
First Congress, regarding the intent of the Framers in adopting the phrase "cruel and un-
usual").
136. Furman, 408 U.S. at 263 (Brennan, J., concurring).
137. Id.
138. Weems, 217 U.S. at 373.
139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. FOLEY, supra note 121, at 24.
141. Id. at 26.
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punishments.4 2 The wide-ranging, jurisprudential change lies in the Weems
majority's claim that the Constitution could not be limited to the narrow
interpretation surrounding its birth, nor could its provisions be reduced to
"impotent and lifeless formulas." '143 Instead, the provisions should be inter-
preted based on gradual changes in public opinion.'" In what is now a fa-
miliar mantra of strict constructionists, Justice Byron White dissented to
what he saw as the majority replacing its judgment for that of the legislature;
he stated that the clause simply reflects the Framers' intention to prohibit the
types of torturous and barbaric punitive practices common in seventeenth-
century England.'45
Trop v. Dulles 46 was another non-capital case with significant implica-
tions for the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.'47 The defendant
serviceman was court-martialed for desertion, and when he later applied for
a passport, he learned that the conviction had also stripped him of his United
States citizenship.'48 The statute was a Civil War holdover enacted by Con-
gress under its war powers, and the law granted discretion to the military in
deciding whether a deserter would be denationalized. 4 9 In a five-four deci-
sion, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote for the majority and cited Weems for
the Court's view of the Eighth Amendment: "[T]he Court recognized in
[Weems] that the words of the Amendment are not precise, and that their
scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolv-
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.
' 15°
Despite the Court's inability to define the precise scope of the provision, the
majority stated that "[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment
is nothing more than the dignity of man."''
In holding that denationalization was a "cruel and unusual" punish-
ment, the majority added that the punishment of statelessness is completely
uncivilized because it destroys the individual's status in organized society. 52
Chief Justice Warren reasoned that, because the death penalty was still
widely accepted, it could not be said to violate the "cruel" prong of the
142. Id.
143. Id at 25-26; see also Weems, 217 U.S. at 373.
144. Weems, 217 U.S. at 378.
145. Id at 387, 397 (White, J., dissenting). The Court has frequently cited the following
article in its modem death-penalty jurisprudence beginning in Furman and as recently as
Roper. Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted': The Original
Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839 (1969).
146. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality).
147. Id at 100-01.
148. Id. at 87-88.
149. Id at 89-90.
150. Id. at 100-01 (emphasis added).
151. Id at 100.
152. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
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phrase.'53 Equally clear to Chief Justice Warren, however, was that the mere
existence of the death penalty did not license the government "to devise any
punishment short of death within the limits of its imagination." '154 Similar to
Justice McKenna's opinion in Weems, Chief Justice Warren opined that the
Constitution's provisions are not "time-worn adages or hollow shibbo-
leths,"' 55 but that "[t]hey are vital, living principles that authorize and limit
governmental powers in our Nation. '
In his dissent, Justice Felix Frankfurter concluded that this punishment
was valid under the congressional war power, and he noted that punishment
for desertion was not considered to be unusual in other civilized nations.
57
He was baffled by how the majority considered that denationalization could
be a fate worse than death because the majority made it clear they had no
issue with capital punishment itself' 58 Similar to Justice White's dissent in
Weems, Justice Frankfurter saw the majority's decision as an unrestrained
usurpation of its judicial power and an unconstitutional foray into legislative
and executive territory.1
59
C. Modem Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence: Exempting Classes of Indi-
viduals
1. Juveniles
The Court decided two juvenile death penalty cases a year apart; how-
ever, it took different approaches in each case. 6 ° In Thompson v. Okla-
homa,161 the plurality-comprised of Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun-decided the case by (1) looking for objective indicia of a
national consensus against the execution of fifteen year olds, (2) considering
the practice of sentencing juries, (3) conducting a proportionality analysis of
the penal goals the death penalty is meant to serve, and (4) considering the
practices of other nations. 162 In Stanford v. Kentucky, 163 the majority-
comprised of Justices Scalia, White, Kennedy, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist-decided the case by looking for objective indicia of national
153. Id. at 99.
154. Id.
155. "Shibboleth" is defined as a "slogan," "catchword," or as "[a] common saying or
idea." AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1130 (2d College ed. 1985).
156. Trop, 356 U.S. at 103 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 121, 126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 125.
159. Id. at 128.
160. See infra Part III.C.l.a-b.
161. 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality).
162. Id. at 818.
163. 492 U.S. 361 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
[Vol. 29
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & CRIMINAL LAW
consensus and the practices of sentencing juries."6 The Court in both deci-
sions based its analysis on the evolving standards of decency but disagreed
over which states should be counted. 65 Furthermore, Stanford rejected the
proportionality analysis and the consideration of the practices in other na-
tions. 16
a. Thompson v. Oklahoma'67
The juvenile death penalty did not become an issue until the 1980s.
1' 6
Two juvenile death penalty cases tempted the Supreme Court during this
period, but the Court did not squarely face the issue until it granted certiorari
in Thompson.169 The Court, in a four-one-three decision, held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibited the execution of juveniles who were under sixteen at
the time of their capital crime. 170 Along with three adults, fifteen-year-old
Thompson participated in the brutal murder of his former brother-in-law.' 7'
In a certification hearing, the Oklahoma trial court recognized that Thomp-
son was a "child" under Oklahoma law but found that there were "no rea-
sonable prospects" for his rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system.
72
Accordingly, the court tried Thompson as an adult under the state's statutory
certification procedure for juveniles. 73 At sentencing, the jury found the
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" nature of the murder to be an ag-
gravating circumstance and sentenced Thompson to death. 174 The Court
granted certiorari to determine whether the death sentence for a crime com-
mitted by a fifteen-year-old was cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment. "
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the plurality opinion and began his
analysis by noting that the Framers had not specifically defined the categori-
cal prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments; therefore, he stated
that it was the Court's task to weigh this question against the "evolving
164. Id. at 364.
165. See infra Part III.C.1.a-b.
166. See infra Part III.C.1.b.
167. 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion).
168. Victor L. Streib, Children, Crime, and Consequences: Juvenile Justice in America,
14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 121, 130 (2003).
169. Id. at 131.
170. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 817, 838 (1988) (plurality). Justice Anthony
Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Id. at 818.
171. Id. at 819.
172. Id.
173. Id.




standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."' 76 Since
Trop, the Court had developed indicators for how it would review its evolv-
ing-standards test.' The Court employed these indicators in Thompson by
(1) looking at state death-penalty laws for any trends or national consensus,
(2) considering jury determinations, (3) considering the views of profes-
sional organizations and other nations, and (4) making an independent
judgment based on a culpability and proportionality analysis of the retribu-
tive and deterrent goals of the death penalty.'78
The Court began by analogizing how American society differentiated
between the rights of children and adults by specifically looking at how
other Oklahoma laws differentiated between these two classes. 79 The Court
stated that Oklahoma had a juvenile justice system like all other states and
that it had a statute that permitted sixteen and seventeen-year-olds charged
with serious felonies to be tried as adults. 8 The Court also stated that every
other civil or criminal statute in Oklahoma treated any person under the age
of sixteen as a "child."'' Furthermore, the Court observed that Oklahoma
joined other states in nearly complete unanimity in treating individuals un-
der sixteen as minors by forbidding them to vote, sit on a jury, drive or
marry without parental consent, purchase pornography, or gamble.'82 Addi-
tionally, the majority considered it relevant that all states had laws setting
the maximum age for juvenile court jurisdiction at least at age sixteen. 83
The Court observed that most death-penalty states had not set a mini-
mum age limit for the execution of juvenile offenders.8 4 Specifically, nine-
teen states permitted capital punishment but did not set age minimums, and
fourteen states outlawed the practice outright. 85 Accordingly, Justice Ste-
vens reasoned that these jurisdictions did not help in the analysis one way or
the other and that the Court should consider only the eighteen states that did
establish minimum age limits. 86 Justice Stevens added that the respondents
raised no evidence suggesting that the legislatures of the nineteen death-
penalty states considered how the interplay of their certification and capital
176. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 821 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 86, 101 (1958)
(plurality)).
177. Id. at 822.
178. Id. at 822-23, 833.
179. Id. at 823.
180. Id. at 823-24.
181. Id. at 824.
182. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 824.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 826.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 826-29.
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statutes qualified adolescents to be eligible for the death penalty.'87 Focusing
only on the eighteen minimum-age states, the plurality observed that all of
those states required that the defendant be at least sixteen to qualify for the
death penalty. 188 To further bolster its consensus argument, the plurality
recognized many respected organizations that opposed the death penalty for
juveniles and other western nations that forbade the practice outright.'89
The Court then turned to the behavior of capital juries in the twentieth
century and discovered that eighteen to twenty juveniles were executed for
crimes committed while they were under the age of sixteen.19° The plurality
concluded from this infrequency that "the imposition of the death penalty on
[fifteen-year-old offenders] is now generally abhorrent to the conscience of
the community."''
Next, Justice Stevens addressed whether there was a difference in the
culpability level of a juvenile offender versus an adult offender.' The plu-
rality noted previous cases in which the Court endorsed the proposition that
juveniles as a class are less mature and responsible than adults, and it was
this crucial difference that the Court determined would require youth to be a
mitigating factor in capital cases.' 93 Because the Court endorsed the idea that
less culpability should attach to juveniles than to adults for the same crime,
it reasoned that the conduct of a juvenile cannot be as morally reprehensible
as the same conduct by an adult."'
The plurality observed that the death penalty is supposed to serve the
twin penal goals of retribution and deterrence.' In fact, the Court endorsed
the proposition that retribution is often justified as a valid expression of so-
ciety's moral outrage at particular conduct. 196 The plurality concluded, how-
ever, that juveniles are less mature as a class, have a better shot at rehabilita-
tion, and are generally treated differently as a class; therefore, retribution
was inapplicable to the execution of a fifteen-year-old offender.' 97 Similarly,
187. Id. The dissent argued that these nineteen states implicitly do support the punish-
ment for offenders below the age of fifteen. Id. at 867-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
188. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 829 (majority opinion).
189. Id. at 830. The Court cited the American Bar Association, American Law Institute,
and the abolition of the practice in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, the former
West Germany, France, Germany, the Netherlands, all Scandanavian nations, Canada, Italy,
Spain, Switzerland, and the former Soviet Union. Id.
190. Id. at 832. The statistic is eighteen to twenty because the exact birthdates of two of
the juveniles executed were unknown-both individuals were either fifteen or sixteen. Id.
The Court noted that the last under-sixteen execution in the nation occurred in 1948. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 833.
193. Id. at 834.
194. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835.
195. Id. at 836.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 836-37.
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the plurality concluded that the goal of deterrence was inapplicable because
it was unlikely that juveniles entertained any cost-benefit analysis as to the
possibility of being executed. 98 Indeed, the Court stated that it is "fanciful"
to believe that a teen offender would be deterred by the knowledge that only
about twenty juveniles were executed in the twentieth century. 199
The plurality vacated the sentence and concluded that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of individuals below the age of six-
teen.200 The Court based its decision on its independent judgment that the
death penalty for these offenders does not contribute to the penal goals that
capital punishment is meant to serve; therefore, the punishment is "nothing
more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.,
21
In his dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia agreed that the best indicator of
evolving standards was the legislation society enacts, but he took issue with
the plurality's national-consensus analysis because it did not recognize the
nineteen states that allowed the death penalty as counterevidence that these
states implicitly support the penalty for this class of offenders.2 2 All of these
death-penalty states had statutes that certified juveniles into criminal court
and did not deliberately close this avenue of certification for fifteen-year-
olds; thus, the interplay of the statutes made the child offender eligible for
the death penalty.2 3 This is precisely what happened to Thompson.2 °4 Okla-
homa was one of the nineteen states without explicitly drawn minimum age
limits.2 5 In addition, Justice Scalia attacked the plurality's analysis of jury
determinations, and he found no support for any relevant trend from the
mere fact that juveniles are rarely executed.206 Rather, Justice Scalia stated
that the infrequency was most likely due to individualized sentencing de-
terminations and the decline in public support for the death penalty in gen-
eral.20 7 Justice Scalia rejected outright the plurality's consideration of the
practices of other nations as having any bearing on the fundamental beliefs
of this nation.20 8
In her concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor observed that
a national consensus against the death penalty for fifteen-year-olds likely
did exist, especially after adding the fourteen abolition states to the eighteen
198. Id. at 837.
199. Id. at 838.
200. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838.
201. Id. (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
202. Id. at 865, 867 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
203. See id. at 867--68.
204. Id. at 824 (majority opinion), 850 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
205. See id. at 824, 850.
206. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 869-70 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 869.
[Vol. 29
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & CRIMINAL LAW
minimum-age states. 2 9 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor agreed with the plu-
rality that the dissent relied on misleading statistics in citing the nineteen
death-penalty states without minimum age limits as deliberate support for
the death-eligibility of this class of offenders.2" ' Justice O'Connor added that
there was no evidence that these states deliberately considered the effect of
how their juvenile certification and capital punishment statutes would inter-
act to make these individuals death-eligible.21' In other words, since the
Oklahoma death penalty statute specified no minimum age, it served to op-
erate in conjunction with the juvenile certification statute-authorizing fif-
teen-year-olds to be treated as adults-in a way that created the appearance
of a less-than-deliberate choice by these state legislatures to render fifteen-
year-old defendants death-eligible.2 2 Therefore, Justice O'Connor reasoned
that there was a risk that the Oklahoma state legislature had not fully con-
sidered this statutory interaction.2t 3 In the absence of more explicit evidence
of a national consensus, Justice O'Connor chose not to address the constitu-
tional question."4
b. Stanford v. Kentucky2 5
One year after the Court decided Thompson, it granted certiorari to de-
cide whether the Eighth Amendment forbade the imposition of the death
penalty for two offenders who committed their crimes when they were six-
teen and seventeen-years old. 6 Justice Scalia wrote for the majority, which
held that the punishment did not offend the Eighth Amendment's bar of
cruel and unusual punishments. 2 7 The Court began by observing that the
death penalty for sixteen and seventeen-year-old offenders was not consid-
ered "cruel and unusual" at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, and the
Court noted the common law rebuttable presumption that theoretically al-
lowed the death penalty for offenders as young as age seven.2 18 Next, the
209. Id. at 849 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
210. Id. at 850.
211. Id.
212. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 850.
213. See id. at 851-52.
214. Id. at 855.
215. 492 U.S. 361 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
216. Id. at 368.
217. Id. at 380. The Court reviewed the consolidated appeals of two offenders from Ken-
tucky and Missouri in which the juvenile courts addressed the individual circumstances in
each case and certified the offenders into adult criminal court. Id. at 265-68. Kevin Stanford
of Kentucky committed capital murder when he was seventeen, and Heath Wilkins of Mis-
souri committed capital murder when he was sixteen. Id. at 365-66.
218. Id. at 368.
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majority addressed the petitioners' views that the "evolving standards of
decency" prohibited the death penalty in their cases.219
The majority cited Coker v. Georgia,220 a case in which the Court ob-
served that Eighth Amendment judgments should never be based on the
subjective opinions of the justices but only on objective evidence. 22, Also,
citing his dissent in Thompson, Justice Scalia emphasized that only Ameri-
can conceptions of decency are dispositive-not the practices in other na-
tions.222
The majority continued the evolving-standards analysis by noting that
the best objective indicia of modem trends are the statutes passed by the
nation's elected bodies.223 Justice Scalia then noted previous decisions in
which the Court discovered a significant national consensus sufficient to
warrant a label of "cruel and unusual., 224 Out of the thirty-seven death-
penalty states, the majority counted the fifteen death-penalty states that did
not impose the penalty upon sixteen-year-old offenders and the twelve states
that did not impose the penalty upon seventeen-year-old offenders.225 With
thirty-seven as the denominator, the Court concluded that neither tally was a
majority of the death-penalty states. 226 The Court stressed that this consensus
was insufficient when compared to the Court's other examples of over-
whelming national consensus.227 The majority addressed the dissent's con-
tention that the non-death-penalty states should be included in the calculus
by indicating that those jurisdictions bear only upon whether there was a
consensus against the death penalty altogether, and these abolition states
said nothing specifically about whether offenders under the age of eighteen
should be exempt.228 Justice Scalia analogized that "[t]he dissent's position
[was] rather like discerning a national consensus that wagering on cock-
219. Id. at 369 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
220. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). Coincidentally, Coker is also the source of the controversial
notion that, in the end, the Court will make an independent judgment about whether a particu-
lar punishment is appropriate under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 597.
221. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369. "Eighth Amendment judgments should not be, or appear
to be, merely the subjective views of individual Justices; judgment should be informed by
objective factors to the maximum possible extent." Id. (citing Coker, 433 U.S. at 592).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 370.
224. Id. at 371 (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (invalidating the death
penalty for the insane because no states allowed it)); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)
(invalidating the death penalty for an accomplice who was not the trigger-man in a felony-
murder because only eight jurisdictions allowed it); Coker, 433 U.S. at 600 (invalidating the
death penalty for rape because Georgia was the sole jurisdiction allowing it).
225. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 371.
228. Id.
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fights is inhumane by counting within that consensus those States that bar
all wagering."22 9
The petitioners argued that the actions of modem district attorneys and
sentencing juries showed that juveniles were rarely charged with capital
crimes and sentenced to death; thus, society generally condemned the prac-
tice.230 The majority conceded that only about two percent of executions
since 1642 happened to offenders under the age of eighteen at the time of
the crime, but the Court stated that it was entirely probable that "the very
considerations [that] induce petitioners and their supporters to believe that
death should never be imposed on offenders under [eighteen] cause prosecu-
tors and juries to believe that it should rarely be imposed.
231
The majority rejected the petitioners' and their supporters' reliance on
other state laws that set age minimums at eighteen or more for actions such
as voting, driving, and drinking.232 The Court observed that maturity bears
little on whether a person votes intelligently, drives carefully, or drinks re-
sponsibly and that these laws are created from general determinations
only.233 The Court saw no practical relation between being able to do these
things and being mature enough to know that murder is wrong.234 The ma-
jority noted that individualized consideration of mitigating factors, such as
youth, was mandatory in capital cases and that juvenile transfer statutes re-
quired consideration of the maturity level and moral responsibility of the
juvenile before certification to a criminal court.2 35 Therefore, the Court de-
termined that courts gave sufficient individualized attention to the mitigating
factor of age.236 The Court also rejected the petitioners' other indicia of na-
tional consensus, consisting of opinion polls, views of various interest
groups and professional associations, and the psychological and emotional
development studies offered by petitioners' amici.23' Additionally, the Court
dismissed the evidence relied on by petitioners to prove that the retributive
and deterrent goals of the death penalty were not served by executing juve-
niles.238
Finally, Justice Scalia rejected the dissent's contention that the Court's
opinion left to the state legislatures the task of defining the scope of the
229. Id. at 371 n.2.
230. Id. at 373.




235. Id at 375.
236. Id




Eighth Amendment when it is the Court's task to define the provision.239
Justice Scalia responded to the dissent by observing the following:
[w]hen this Court cast loose from the historical moorings consisting of
the original application of the Eighth Amendment, it did not embark
rudderless upon a wide open sea. Rather, it limited the Amendment's ex-
tension to those practices contrary to the "evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society." It has never been thought
that this was a shorthand reference to the preferences of a majority of
this Court.2 40
Unlike the plurality in Thompson, Justice Scalia considered it unneces-
sary to apply a proportionality analysis of the culpability of the offender or
review whether the penal goals of the death penalty were served.24 1 Rather,
the majority believed that state laws and individualized jury determinations
adequately addressed proportionality.242 The Court concluded that the Eighth
Amendment does not forbid the death penalty for sixteen and seventeen-
year-old offenders.243
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor observed that "[t]he most salient
characteristic that bears on this case is that every single American legislature
that has expressly set a minimum age for capital punishment has set that age
at [sixteen] or above., 244 For Justice O'Connor, the petitioners fell into a
constitutionally permitted class of executable offenders.245 Justice O'Connor
disagreed with the majority's conclusion that a proportionality analysis was
unnecessary and, instead, supported the consideration of other state statutes
that distinguished juveniles from adults.246
Justice Brennan wrote for the dissent and concluded that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the capital punishment for an offender under eighteen
at the time of the crime.2 47 The dissent tracked the plurality in Thompson by
employing (1) an evolving-standards analysis of the state statutes, (2) con-
239. Id. at 378.
240. Id. at 379 (internal citations omitted).
241. Id.
242. See id at 379-80; see generally Jeffrey Fagan, Atkins, Adolescence, and the Matur-
ity Heuristic: Rationales for a Categorical Exemption for Juveniles from Capital Punishment,
33 N.M. L. REv. 207 (2003). This author argued that Stanford incorrectly assumed that the
less culpable are safely filtered out early in the course of the trial process. Fagan, supra, at
234. Fagan argued that just because procedural due process was met does not mean that sub-
stantive considerations of culpability were properly conducted within constitutional bounds.
Id.
243. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 857-58
(1980) (plurality) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
244. Id. at 381.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 382.
247. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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sideration of jury determinations, (3) social scientific evidence of various
organizations, (4) practices of other nations, and (5) a proportionality analy-
sis of the culpability level of the juvenile weighed against the death-penalty
goals of retribution and deterrence.2 8 The dissent rejected the Court's "dis-
torted view" of how the states fell in the national consensus analysis by ob-
serving that when the fifteen non-death-penalty states were added to the
twelve states that set a minimum of eighteen, twenty-seven states were
against the death penalty for the eighteen-year-old Stanford.249 Similarly,
when the fifteen non-death-penalty states were added to the fifteen states
that set a minimum age of seventeen, thirty states were against the penalty
for Wilkins. °
The dissent also reiterated the Thompson plurality's point that there
was no evidence that the nineteen states that permitted the death penalty
deliberately authorized the death penalty for juveniles simply by having a
death-penalty statute and a juvenile-certification statute. 5' Justice Brennan
cited Justice O'Connor's statement in her concurrence that the issue is too
important to assume that these states implicitly condoned the execution of
juveniles without having carefully considered the possibility of how these
statutes interact.252 Therefore, the dissent determined that twenty-seven
states were against the death penalty for Stanford, thirty were against the
penalty for Wilkins, and nineteen had not directly faced the question.25 3 The
dissent continued the remainder of its analysis in much the same way as the
plurality in Thompson. 4
2. Atkins v. Virginia:255 Exempting the Mentally Retarded
In order to fully understand how the Court exempted juveniles from
capital punishment in Roper, it is necessary to review how the Court ex-
empted the mentally retarded from capital punishment because the Court
took nearly identical approaches to these cases. The Court's jurisprudence
regarding the execution of the mentally retarded began in Penry v. Ly-
naugh256 and ended thirteen years later in Atkins. In Penry, the majority-
comprised of Justices O'Connor, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens-
248. Id. at 383-84.
249. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 384-85.
250. Id. at 384.
251. Id. at 385.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 385-405; see supra Part III.C.l.a.
255. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). The Court's decision in Atkins created a new avenue for Sim-
mons to appeal his sentence by arguing that a similar national consensus had developed in the
states against the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders. See supra Part II.B.4.
256. 492 U.S. 302 (1989); see infra note 258.
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employed an evolving-standards analysis and discovered no national con-
sensus against the death penalty for this class of offenders.2 7 The Court held
that no prophylactic rule was appropriate and that juries were able to con-
sider the condition of mental retardation as a mitigating factor in capital
cases. 258 In Atkins, the majority--comprised of Justices Stevens, O'Connor,
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer-employed an evolving-standards
analysis and discovered that a national consensus had developed against the
execution of the mentally retarded.259 Also, the Court determined that sen-
tencing the mentally retarded to the death penalty was a disproportionate
punishment because of the diminished culpability and cognitive deficiencies
of the class. 26" The following section explores the Court's use of the evolv-
ing-standards test in Atkins, in which the Court concluded that the mentally
retarded are a class of individuals deserving special protection from the
death penalty.
Thirteen years after Penry, the Court reconsidered the issue of whether
the Eighth Amendment's evolving-standards analysis would uncover any
legislative change with regard to the execution of mentally retarded offend-
ers. 6 Finding a new consensus, the Court overruled Penry in a six-three
decision and held that the provision prohibited the execution of the mentally
retarded.262 At trial, the jury considered evidence of the offender's mental
257. Penry, 492 U.S. at 340.
258. Id. In Penry, the defendant confessed to raping and killing a woman with a pair of
scissors. Id. at 307. The twenty-two-year-old defendant had an IQ of fifty-four and the mental
age of a six and a half-year-old. Id. The Court employed an evolving-standards analysis and
uncovered no national consensus opposing the death penalty for mentally retarded offenders.
Id. at 340. Justice O'Connor began by noting that the provision's modem jurisprudence was
guided by the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
Id. at 330-31. Citing Thompson, the Court observed that the best objective indicators of
evolving standards are the nation's legislatures. Id. at 331. The Court analogized that mental
retardation was akin to the common law notion of "idiocy," which was thought to be a con-
genital condition used to describe a lack of any understanding of the differences between
good and evil. Id. at 331-32. The Court discovered only two states that banned the execution
of a retarded person for a capital crime, and when these states were added to the fourteen
non-death-penalty states, there was still no national consensus. Id. at 334. The petitioner
argued under Thompson that, if a juvenile is less culpable than an adult for certain crimes,
then it follows that mentally retarded persons are less culpable too; Simmons would later
successfully argue, under Atkins, the reverse of this reasoning. Id at 336. In response, the
Court referred to its other holding in Penry that sentencing bodies must consider mental
retardation as a mitigating factor, and therefore, the majority was not persuaded that a cate-
gorical prohibition was appropriate at the time. Id. at 337-38.
259. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
260. Id. at 321.
261. Id. at 307.
262. Id. at 321.
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retardation but still sentenced him to death.263 Following the Court's deci-
sion in Penry, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.26
Justice Stevens began the majority opinion by noting the requirement
that the punishment be proportional to the offense. 265 The majority then dis-
missed the notion that the Eighth Amendment requires an analysis of what
was considered excessive punishment at the time the Bill of Rights was
adopted.21 Instead, the Court decided that the "evolving standards of de-
cency" were the source of the provision's meaning.267 Like the Court in
Thompson, the majority laid out the analytical framework, which consisted
of (1) an evaluation of the objective indicia of national consensus found in
the nation's legislatures, (2) jury determinations, (3) views of professional
organizations and other nations, and (4) the Court's own judgment "on the
question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amend-
ment., 268 In other words, the majority stated that the Court would decide if it
had "reason to disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its
legislators."
269
The majority noted that, since Penry, sixteen states joined the two
states from Penry's era by enacting legislation barring the execution of the
mentally retarded. 270 Despite these numbers, the Court observed that "[i]t is
not so much the number of these states that is significant, but the consis-
tency of the direction of change."27' Also finding that the practice was un-
common in the states that still permitted it, the majority reasoned that the
legislatures of these states were probably in no hurry to change the laws.272
Then, the Court cited amici curiae from various organizations, other nations,
and American opinion polls in support of the conclusion that the practice of
executing the mentally retarded had become an unusual occurrence and that
a national consensus had developed against it.
273
263. Id. at 308-09. The defendant and an accessory kidnapped, robbed, and shot a man
eight times, killing him. Id. at 307. The defendant had an IQ of fifty-nine and a mental age
between ages nine and twelve. Id. at 309-10.
264. Id. at 310.
265. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 311-12 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality)).
268. Id. at312.
269. Id. at 313.
270. Id. at 314-15. The Court observed that Virginia and Nevada passed similar bills in
the House. Id. at 315. A bill passed both chambers in Texas, but it was vetoed by the gover-
nor. Id.
271. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315. The Court emphasized that no states since Penry had re-
versed course and enacted laws permitting the execution of the mentally retarded. Id. at 315-
16.
272. Id. at 316.
273. Id. The Court emphasized that, although this data was not dispositive, it was consis-
tent with the legislative data. Id.
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Having found a consensus, the Court reviewed the general cognitive
deficiencies of the mentally retarded and the ability of capital punishment of
this class to serve the twin penological goals of retribution and deterrence.274
The Court did not suggest that this class of offenders should be exempt from
criminal sanctions, but the majority did conclude that the mentally retarded
are less culpable because they have a diminished capacity to learn, commu-
nicate, reason, and control impulses. 275 The Court reasoned that, because the
average murderer was rarely sentenced to death, the average mentally re-
tarded individual with lesser culpability should not be sentenced to death.276
Furthermore, because capital punishment is primarily an appropriate sanc-
tion for premeditated and deliberate crimes, the Court concluded that it is
not an appropriate sanction for the mentally retarded because of their cogni-
tive deficiencies and impulsivity.277 The Court observed that, although men-
tal retardation is used as a mitigating factor in sentencing determinations,
prosecutors have used the condition as an aggravating factor because the
mentally retarded are often poor witnesses and are poor at showing remorse
or sympathy.278 As a result, the Court reasoned that the mentally retarded are
generally at special risk of wrongful execution.279 In conclusion, the Court
held that execution of the mentally retarded did not further the penal goals
of capital punishment, and, therefore, the Eighth Amendment prohibits such
excessive punishment for this class of offenders.28
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a separate dissent, joined by Justices
Scalia and Thomas, in which he criticized the Court's finding of a consensus
from a mere eighteen states, and the majority's reliance on amici curiae,
opinion polls, and the practices of other countries.28" ' Chief Justice Rehnquist
observed that these sources were irrelevant to the constitutional question at
hand and that the evolving-standards analysis should be based only on the
conclusions of legislatures and sentencing juries. 2 Preferring Penry's rejec-
tion of such data, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated the following:
[flor the Court to rely on such data today serves only to illustrate its will-
ingness to proscribe by judicial fiat-at the behest of private organiza-
274. Id. at 318-19.
275. Id. at318.
276. Id. at 319.
277. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319-20.
278. Id. at 320-21. The Court noted that the mentally retarded are more likely to give
false confessions and are less able to effectively assist counsel in their defense. Id.
279. Id.at321.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 321-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Neither Chief Justice Rehnquist's nor
Justice Scalia's dissent counted the non-death-penalty states in the evolving-standards analy-
sis. See id. at 321-22, 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
282. Id. at 322-24 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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tions speaking only for themselves-a punishment about which no
across-the-board consensus has developed through the workings of nor-
mal democratic processes in the laboratories of the States.8 3
Justice Scalia began his dissent by noting not only the absence of any
textual basis for the majority's decision but also the absence of real evidence
of a national consensus. 284 After restating the facts of the case, Justice Scalia
addressed the two categories of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence: those
punishments that were considered "cruel and unusual" at the time the Bill of
Rights was adopted and those that are inconsistent with the evolving stan-
dards of decency.
2 85
Like the Court in Penry, Justice Scalia analogized that the severely
mentally retarded were known as "idiots" in 1791 and that less severe cases
of retardation qualified for capital punishment during that era.2 86 As for
evolving standards, Justice Scalia criticized the majority for "miraculously
extract[ing] a 'national consensus' . . . from the fact that [eighteen] States-
less than half ([forty-seven percent]) of the [thirty-eight] States that permit
capital punishment []-have very recently enacted legislation barring execu-
tion of the mentally retarded., 287 Scalia emphasized that, because forty-
seven percent of death penalty states did not yield a consensus, it was no
wonder that the majority did not emphasize the number of states but, in-
stead, noted a trend toward abolition.2 8 Justice Scalia reasoned that the in-
frequent execution of the mentally retarded was not reliable evidence for the
majority's national consensus analysis; instead, he argued that the infre-
quency was most likely due to the mentally retarded comprising only a frac-
tion of the population and to sentencing juries' uses of mental retardation as
a mitigating factor.
2 89
In complete agreement with Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia
noted that "the [p]rize for the Court's [m]ost [f]eeble [e]ffort" to create a
national consensus went to the majority's footnoted appeal to various pro-
fessional organizations, the practices of other nations, and opinion polls.2
Next, Justice Scalia cited his dissent in Thompson to address his view that
the real basis of the majority opinion was the subjective beliefs of the major-
ity.29' Justice Scalia attacked the two premises of the Court's opinion, ob-
serving that the Eighth Amendment had never been concerned with exces-
283. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 326.
284. Id. at 337-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 339-40.
286. Id. at 340-41.
287. Id. at 342.
288. Id. at 343, 344 (emphasis added).
289. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347.




sive punishments but with torturous and barbaric practices like "the rack and
the thumbscrew., 29 2 Furthermore, Justice Scalia criticized the Court's pre-
sumption that judges and juries are unable to properly use mental retardation
as a mitigating factor in sentencing.293
As for retribution, Justice Scalia uncovered no evidence for the general
proposition that mentally retarded offenders were categorically no more
culpable than the average murderer.294 Similarly, Justice Scalia discovered
no basis for the Court's deterrence analysis because the majority stated that
the mentally retarded were only "less likely" to weigh the consequences of
their actions.295 Thus, if at least some of the mentally retarded were deterred
by the possibility of capital punishment, then the practice was adequately
vindicated.296
IV. REASONING
In Roper v. Simmons,297 the United States Supreme Court held that the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments included
the execution of juvenile offenders who were under the age of eighteen at
the time they committed their capital crime.298 Justice Anthony Kennedy
wrote for the majority, which also consisted of Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer.299 The Court largely mirrored its approach in Atkins,
finding that a national consensus had emerged since Stanford and also that
the death penalty was a disproportionate punishment for juveniles as a
class.300 Furthermore, the majority discussed the danger of having juries
make determinations about culpability when the offender was in such a tran-
sient period of psychological and cognitive development.30 ' Finally, the ma-
jority emphasized that the United States was the only country in the world
that continued to officially sanction the juvenile death penalty.3"2
Justice Stevens filed a short concurring opinion in which he champi-
oned the evolving-standards test over an original-intent approach to the
Eighth Amendment.3 3 Justice O'Connor filed a dissent in which she con-
doned the majority's approach to the constitutional question but not the ma-
292. Id. at 349.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 350.
295. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 351.
296. Id.
297. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
298. Id. at 578.
299. Id. at 554.
300. Id. at 564, 572.
301. Id. at 568-73.
302. Id. at 575.
303. Roper, 543 U.S. at 587 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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jority's application of the approach or the outcome.3' 4 Justice Scalia filed a
separate dissenting opinion in which he disputed that a national consensus
against the practice existed, and he argued that juries are fully capable of
making individualized determinations about the proportionality of punish-
ment."5 Justice Scalia also rejected the scientific evidence relied on by the
majority, and he stated that the practices of other nations were irrelevant." 6
A. Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court and began the
analysis by discussing the relevant, controlling authority from the Court's
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 37 The majority cited the plain language
of the Eighth Amendment and the modem doctrinal rules for Eighth
Amendment analysis from Weems 308 and Trop.309 Then, the Court discussed
how it had applied these principles in Thompson,
310 Stanford,3 11 Penry,312
and Atkins.31 3 The majority emphasized that the Atkins Court returned to the
rule predating Stanford that "the Constitution contemplates that in the end
[the Justices'] own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the
acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.,
314
Having set the stage for considering the present case, the majority rea-
soned that evidence of a national consensus against the juvenile death pen-
alty largely paralleled the evidence used by the Atkins Court to determine
whether a national consensus existed against the death penalty for the men-
tally retarded. 315 The majority observed that Atkins discovered eighteen
states against the death penalty for the mentally retarded and that a similar
eighteen states currently prohibited the execution of juveniles .3 6 When the
Court added the twelve abolition states to these eighteen, a total of thirty
states prohibited the death penalty for both classes of offenders. 317 Next, the
majority noted the infrequency with which the remaining twenty states had
304. Id. at 587-607 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
305. Id. at 609, 620 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
306. Id. at 617, 622.
307. Id. at 560-64 (majority opinion).
308. See supra notes 133-45.
309. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560-61; see supra notes 146-57.
310. See supra notes 167-214.
311. See supra notes 215-54.
312. See supra note 258.
313. Roper, 543 U.S. at 561-63.
314. Id. at 563 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality)).





executed the mentally retarded and compared this fact to the similar infre-
quency of these states in executing juveniles.3"'
The Court did note, however, one difference regarding the rate of abo-
lition between the execution of the mentally retarded and juveniles.3"9 Atkins
observed that sixteen additional states enacted legislation barring the execu-
tion of the mentally retarded since the Court decided Penry.320 In contrast,
only five states had ceased executing juveniles since the Court decided Stan-
ford.32' The Court suggested that the reason for this change was that many
states had recognized the inappropriateness of executing juveniles before the
Court decided Stanford.322 Also, the Court noted that no state since either
Penry or Stanford had reinstated the death penalty for mentally retarded or
juvenile offenders, respectively.323 In support of its reasoning, the Court
cited Atkins for the proposition that "[i]t is not so much the number of these
States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change. 324
The majority concluded its national-consensus analysis by noting three
facts: (1) a majority of states have rejected the death penalty for juveniles;
(2) the practice is infrequent where it remains in effect; and (3) a trend has
developed in the direction of abolition.3 2' Therefore, the Court concluded
that society viewed juveniles as generally less culpable than adults.326
The majority cited its death-penalty jurisprudence for the well-settled
proposition that a sentence of death has always been reserved for a narrow
category of crimes and imposed on a narrow class of offenders.3 27 After re-
viewing scientific data, the Court cautioned against characterizing juveniles
as the worst offenders because of the following: (1) juveniles are more im-
mature and irresponsible than adults; (2) they are more susceptible to nega-
tive influences; and (3) their personalities are less fixed than the personali-
ties of adults.328 In Thompson, the Court recognized these same principles
and applied them to its prohibition of the death penalty for offenders under
318. Id.
319. Roper, 543 U.S. at 565.
320. Id. at 565.-
321. Id.
322. Id. at 566-67.
323. Id. at 566.
324. Id.
325. Roper, 543 U.S. at 567; see generally Jeffrey Fagan et al., The Decline of the Juve-
nile Death Penalty: Scientific Evidence of Evolving Norms, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
427 (2005). Fagan employed empirical models to explain why the juvenile death penalty is
such a rare occurrence, and he used this data to prove the emergence of a societal norm
against the juvenile death penalty. Fagan et al., supra, at 429-31.
326. Roper, 543 U.S. at 567.
327. Id. at 568-69.
328. Id. at 569-70.
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the age of sixteen at the time of the crime.329 The majority held that this
same reasoning applies to all juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen.33°
Once the Court established the diminished culpability of juveniles in
general, it addressed whether the penal justifications of retribution and de-
terrence applied to juveniles.33" ' In Atkins, the Court held that the diminished
capacity of the mentally retarded made them less culpable and, therefore,
inappropriate candidates for the death penalty.332 Similarly, the Roper major-
ity reasoned that this form of retribution was not appropriate as applied to
the lesser culpability of juvenile offenders.333 As for deterrence, the Court
followed its reasoning in Thompson in which the plurality surmised that
juveniles generally do not conduct a cost-benefit analysis of their actions.334
Therefore, the Court concluded that neither penal goal provided adequate
justification for the juvenile death penalty.335
The majority recognized but disagreed with the petitioner's argument
that at least some juveniles exhibit sufficient maturity and depravity of mind
to qualify for the death penalty. 36 The majority observed that the differences
between juveniles and adults are too substantial to risk the death penalty.337
The Court noted the danger that juries could sentence juvenile offenders to
death for cold-blooded murder without giving appropriate consideration not
only to the mitigating factor of youth but also to the juvenile's lesser culpa-
bility in general.338 Similarly, the Court highlighted the danger of prosecu-
tors using the mitigating factor of youth as an aggravator, as it was used in
this case.3 3 9 The Court also pointed out that the practice of the American
Psychiatric Association prohibited psychiatrists-with all of their clinical
expertise-from diagnosing juveniles under eighteen with antisocial person-
ality disorder.340 Thus, the majority reasoned that if psychologists and psy-
chiatrists could not agree on whether a juvenile crime was the result of tran-
329. Id. at 570-71.
330. Id. at 571.
331. Id.
332. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 571-72.
336. Id. The petitioners asserted that the penalty was normally sought on a case-by-case
basis and that jurors already appropriately considered age as a mitigating factor, Id. Further-
more, in arguing against a categorical rule, the petitioners pointed to the Court's own cases in
which aggravating and mitigating factors must be considered in death-penalty cases. See id.
at 572.
337. Id. at 572-73.





sient immaturity or irreparable corruption, then juries should not be asked to
consider the death penalty for juveniles.34'
The majority overruled Stanford and concluded that the logic of
Thompson extended to those offenders who were under eighteen at the time
of their crimes.342 Furthermore, the majority stated that Stanford's national
consensus analysis was incomplete because it did not consider the twelve
states that prohibited the death penalty outright.343 As an additional justifica-
tion for overruling Stanford, the majority observed that Stanford rejected the
principle from earlier Eighth Amendment cases that the Court must "bring
its independent judgment to bear on the proportionality of the death penalty
for a particular class of crimes or offenders." '
Finally, the Court recognized that the United States remained the only
country in the world that officially sanctioned the juvenile death penalty. 4
The majority was careful to point out that this fact, while not dispositive,
was a stark reality.346 In addition, the majority cited several previous cases in
which the Court referred to the laws of other nations to guide its decision in
interpreting the Eighth Amendment.3 47 The majority emphasized that virtu-
ally all European nations prohibited the death penalty for juveniles and that
the United States joined Somalia as the only two states that had not ratified
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.34 The majority
noted that only seven other countries had executed juvenile offenders: Iran,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, and China. 349 The majority added that all of these nations had either
abolished the juvenile death penalty or publicly disavowed the practice since
1990.
310
In conclusion, the Court observed that there are certain fundamental
rights preserving the dignity of man inherent in our Constitution, and it is
important to recognize how other nations demonstrate these rights. 35 ' The
majority held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of the
341. Id.
342. Id. at 574.
343. Id.
344. Roper, 543 U.S. at 574.
345. Id. at 575.
346. Id.
347. Id. (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) (plurality); Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958) (plurality)).
348. Id. at 575-76. Among other things, the convention prohibits the execution of juve-
niles. Id.
349. Id. at 577.
350. Roper, 543 U.S. at 577.
351. Id. at 575.
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death penalty on juvenile offenders who were under eighteen at the time of
their capital crime.352
B. Justice Stevens's Concurring Opinion
Justice Stevens's concurrence comprised only a few sentences.353 He
emphasized that the Court's holding reaffirmed the principle that the inter-
pretation of the Eighth Amendment is guided by the evolving standards of
decency.354 Citing Stanford, Justice Stevens added that if the meaning of the
provision was frozen in the common law of 1791, then it would theoretically
allow the execution of a seven-year-old.5 5 Justice Stevens concluded by
noting that the principle that "the Constitution does change from time to
time has been settled since [Chief Justice] John Marshall breathed life into
its text [in Marbury v. Madison
356]." 357
C. Justice O'Connor's Dissenting Opinion
Justice O'Connor determined that neither the evidence of national con-
sensus nor the proportionality analysis sufficed to justify the Court's new
categorical rule.358 Justice O'Connor demanded a clearer showing of na-
tional consensus before she would accept a new rule forbidding the prac-
tice.359 Also, Justice O'Connor noted that the Court did not sufficiently ad-
dress the argument that at least some seventeen-year-old murderers are ma-
ture enough to be death-penalty eligible.36°
Justice O'Connor did not take issue with the majority's general princi-
ples of Eighth Amendment interpretation.36' Furthermore, she supported the
Court's reaffirmation of the notion that the Court must ultimately decide
whether the death penalty is appropriate for a particular class of offenders.362
Justice O'Connor cited her concurrence in Thompson in which she conceded
that a national consensus existed, but she was reticent to impose a categori-
cal rule without a clearer showing from the states.363 Similarly, Justice
O'Connor reiterated her general criticism of the Court's moral proportional-
352. Id. at 578.
353. Id. at 587 (Stevens, J., concurring).
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
357. Roper, 543 U.S. at 587 (Stevens, J., concurring).




362. Id. at 590.
363. Roper, 543 U.S. at 591.
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ity analysis because the Court did not show in Thompson or in the case at
bar that at least some of these offenders are capable of the culpability re-
quired for the death penalty.3"
Justice O'Connor pointed out that the persuasive wave of legislation
between Penry and Atkins barring the death penalty for the mentally re-
tarded led the Court to conclude that a national consensus existed against the
practice.365 More importantly, Justice O'Connor stated that the Court's
moral-proportionality analysis was dispositive in Atkins because the Court
reviewed convincing evidence that showed the sub-average cognitive and
intellectual functioning of the mentally retarded.366 The Court, therefore,
concluded in Atkins that the death penalty was disproportionate when ap-
plied to the mentally retarded.367
Justice O'Connor criticized the Court's failure to even acknowledge
the Missouri Supreme Court's refusal to follow Stanford, and she stated that
this failure was "clear error" apart from the constitutional issue.368 Further-
more, she emphasized that it is "this Court's prerogative alone to overrule
one of its precedents. 369 Justice O'Connor observed that by simply affirm-
ing the lower court, the decision may invite more "disruptive reassessments
of our Eighth Amendment precedents."37
Next, Justice O'Connor agreed that the evidence of national consensus
was similar to Atkins in regard to the numbers, but she determined that the
evidence of national consensus was weaker in other respects.371 Specifically,
Atkins noted significant evidence of opposition to the practice of executing
the mentally retarded and the absence of any actual support for the prac-
tice.372 In the case at bar, there were some states that had specifically set
sixteen or seventeen as the minimum age for death-penalty eligibility and
other states that qualified these offenders for the death penalty through juve-
nile transfer statutes.3" 3 Thus, the same trend in Atkins toward abolition of
capital punishment for the mentally retarded was not present in the states'
treatment of juvenile offenders.374 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor noted that
the Court's evidence of national consensus was weaker than in other cases
364. Id.
365. Id. at 592.
366. Id. at 593.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 593-94.
369. Roper, 543 U.S. at 594.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 595.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 596-97.
374. Id. at 596.
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in which the Court prohibited certain punishments under the Eighth
Amendment.375
Justice O'Connor also reasoned that the moral proportionality argu-
ment in the current case was not persuasive.376 She addressed the premise of
the majority's proportionality analysis, seeing no solid evidentiary basis for
the categorical exemption of this class of offenders.377 First, the premise that
all juveniles are generally less culpable than adults would not mean that
certain seventeen-year-olds could never be mature enough to qualify for the
death penalty.378 Second, Justice O'Connor found unpersuasive the Court's
deterrence argument because the broad conclusion that juveniles are less
likely to be deterred by the threat of death implied that at least some of these
offenders would be deterred.379 In fact, Justice O'Connor considered the
case at bar to be just such a case because Simmons declared that he could
380cacltomurder and get away with it because of his age. Simmons's calculation
suggested that he did indeed weigh the risks involved, and this is precisely
the type of individualized consideration appropriate for a sentencing jury.38 '
Another problem that Justice O'Connor had with the majority's proportion-
ality argument was that the difference in maturity between adults and juve-
niles was premised in the aggregate, and this universal difference fell apart
when comparing individuals.382
Justice O'Connor also found troublesome the Court's comparison of
the juvenile's culpability level to that of the mentally retarded individual.383
Atkins held that the mentally retarded were cognitively and behaviorally
deficient by definition.3 4 In addition, the mentally retarded are not merely
less blameworthy or less deterred, as the Court concluded for juveniles.385
Rather, the mentally retarded have such demonstrated impairments that the
death penalty will not fit their culpability level.3 86 As for juveniles, Justice
O'Connor stated that they do not suffer from the same mental impairments
375. Roper, 543 U.S. at 597.
376. Id. at 598.
377. Id. at 599.
378. Id. In fact, the majority conceded this point but still considered the categorical rule
necessary because it was persuaded that the differences between juveniles and adults were
too well established. Id
379. Id. at 600.
380. Id. 600-01.
381. Roper, 543 U.S. 601.
382. Id. at 601,607.






as the mentally retarded and that comparing the two classes "defies common
sense."
387
Justice O'Connor concluded that the national consensus was "margin-
ally weaker" here and required a clearer showing before a new rule would
be appropriate. 388 For Justice O'Connor, the proportionality argument in
Atkins supported a categorical rule because the proven impairments of the
mentally retarded made it "highly unlikely" that they could act with a level
of culpability sufficient to deserve death.389 Here, a bright-line rule for juve-
niles was not required because the state legislatures could reasonably con-
clude that certain sixteen and seventeen-year-olds would be mature enough
to be eligible for the death penalty. 39 Furthermore, the majority cited no
evidence to support the proposition that sentencing juries are incapable of
weighing the mitigating factor of youth.39'
D. Justice Scalia's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia began by noting that the majority ignored the first step in
an Eighth Amendment analysis: to determine whether the punishment in
dispute was one of the "modes or acts of punishment that had been consid-
ered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted.,
392
Justice Scalia reasoned, therefore, that the original meaning of the provision
did not prohibit the execution of sixteen and seventeen-year-olds. 393 Fur-
thermore, Justice Scalia noted the common law rebuttable presumption that
theoretically permitted the execution of offenders as young as age seven.394
Justice Scalia's dissent quickly pointed out how the majority turned its
minority consensus into a "faux majority. '395 His dissent determined that the
eighteen states that had set the minimum age at eighteen comprised only
forty-seven percent of the thirty-eight jurisdictions that allowed the death
penalty.396 His dissent also reasoned that the twelve states that had abolished
the death penalty altogether shed no light on whether juvenile offenders
should be categorically exempt.397 Justice Scalia pointed out that the Court
387. Roper, 543 U.S. at 602.
388. Id. at 606.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 606-07. Justice O'Connor recognized that, although the prosecution used
youth as an aggravating factor at sentencing, the conduct was not specifically challenged in
the lower courts or raised in certiorari to the Court. Id. at 603.
392. Id. at 609 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,405 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
393. Roper, 543 U.S. at 609.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 611.
396. Id. at 609.
397. Id. at 611.
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did not count the abolition states in any of the previous cases in which the
Court exempted a category of crimes or offenders from capital punish-
ment.
398
Next, Justice Scalia compared the pronounced shift in legislative action
from Penry to Atkins in which sixteen states banned the execution of the
mentally retarded to the mere four states that abolished the death penalty for
juveniles since Stanford.399 Justice Scalia reasoned that the reliance on these
numbers was undermined by the fact that many state legislatures had ex-
pressly affirmed their support for the juvenile death penalty since the Court
decided Stanford.4" Furthermore, he was not persuaded by the infrequency
of juvenile executions because juveniles commit a fraction of capital crimes,
and sentencing juries are required, under the Court's rulings, to consider
youth as a mitigating factor.4"'
Next, Justice Scalia rejected the majority's pronouncement that the
Court had returned to the pre-Stanford rule in which the Court must ulti-
mately judge whether a particular punishment is proportional to the culpa-
bility level of the offender.4°2 Justice Scalia observed that this "supposed
rule" was previously reflected only in dicta and never in holding. 3 Further,
he noted that this notion was flatly repudiated in Stanford because there was
no foundation in law or logic that members of the Court should prescribe the
appropriate standards for society.' Justice Scalia adhered to principles of
legislative primacy and rejected the majority's and Justice O'Connor's view
that a moral-proportionality argument can ultimately override legislative
judgments. 5
Justice Scalia suggested that the Court simply picked scientific and so-
ciological studies that opposed the juvenile death penalty without explaining
the methodology used or why such evidence was appropriate on certiorari
when it was not tested as evidence in the trial court.0 6 In fact, Justice Scalia
noted two separate studies authored by the American Psychological Asso-
ciation: one, relied on by the petitioner, detailed the juvenile's general lack
of moral responsibility, and the other study, from a previous case before the
398. Id.
399. Roper, 543 U.S. at 611-12. Justice Scalia did not count the state of Washington as
part of the majority's five-state tally because the ban in Washington was a result of the Wash-
ington Supreme Court's construction of the state's death-penalty statute, not the result of a
legislative action. Id. at 612. The state court found the statute unconstitutional because it did
not specify a minimum age. Id.
400. Id. at 613.
401. Id. at 614.
402. Id. at 615.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 615-16.
405. Roper, 543 U.S. at 616.
406. Id. at 617.
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Court, took the opposite position." 7 He was not persuaded that these studies
trumped the individualized attention that state legislatures and sentencing
juries gave to the juvenile death-penalty issue. °8
Echoing Stanford, Justice Scalia observed that society's statutes de-
fined age limitations in gross and that individualized tests were not con-
ducted for these laws.' 9 The criminal justice system did, however, conduct
such individual analysis for each defendant in capital cases. 410 Furthermore,
the majority's conclusion that juries are not capable of weighing a defen-
dant's youth against his offense undermined the foundations of the capital-
sentencing system. Moreover, Justice Scalia observed that the system
trusts juries to make difficult human judgments that are not suitable for
codification into statute and to build discretion and flexibility into the legal
system. 2 Justice Scalia dismissed the majority's conclusion that the penal
goals of the death penalty were not served by executing juveniles because
the very case at bar demonstrated that Simmons calculated the risks in-
volved.413
Justice Scalia noted that while the views of American legislatures and
juries were almost irrelevant to the majority, the views of the international
community "[took] center stage."4 14 He observed that the majority seemed
willing to believe that these nations, despite their possible tyrannical politi-
cal make-up or incompetent court systems, actually adhered to their bans on
juvenile executions.4 5 In addition, the majority did not analyze the other
crimes that elicit mandatory death sentences in the nations that still have the
407. Id.
408. Id. at 619.
409. Id. at 620.
410. Id.
411. Roper, 543 U.S. at 620.
412. Id.
413. Id. at 621; see generally Mitchel Brim, A Sneak Preview into How the Court Took
Away a State's Right to Execute Sixteen and Seventeen-Year-Old Juveniles: The Threat of
Execution Will No Longer Save an Innocent Victim's Life, 82 DENV. U. L. REv. 739 (2005).
This author attacked the scientific data relied on by the Roper majority as being inconclusive
and irrelevant to the question of whether the penal goals of the death penalty are adequately
served by executing juveniles. Brim, supra, at 744. Brim proposed that the evolving-
standards test is arbitrary, and, echoing Justice Scalia's dissent in Roper, that the Roper ma-
jority failed to inquire whether the punishment was one of the "modes or acts of punishment
that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted."
Id at 749, 752 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)).
414. Roper, 543 U.S. at 622 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
415. Id. at 623.
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adult death penalty. 16 Justice Scalia reiterated his position that foreign law
has no place in American Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.417
Finally, Justice Scalia's dissent took issue with the majority's failure to
admonish the Missouri Supreme Court for blatantly disregarding the Court's
precedent in Stanford.4 1 He stated that it is this Court's duty alone to over-
rule precedent.4t 9 Furthermore, Justice Scalia reasoned that allowing lower
courts to reinterpret the Eighth Amendment when they decided that enough
time had passed undermines the force of the Court's opinions.42°
V. SIGNIFICANCE
Roper v. Simmons was a controversial decision even though the prac-
tice of executing juveniles was already a very rare occurrence.42' The hold-
ing simply added two years to the decision in Thompson; thus, it is now un-
constitutional to execute any juvenile offender who was under eighteen at
the time of the crime. The decision is considered to be exactly right by some
but completely arbitrary by its opponents-a case of the ends justifying the
means for anti-death penalty advocates.422
A. Roper Criticism
One critic observed that, instead of referring to international practice as
a mere indicator as in Thompson, the Roper majority changed course and
cited foreign practice as confirmation of what human dignity requires in the
United States.423 Thus, aside from the challengeable national consensus
analysis and trend toward abolition, the critic suggested that the Court set
the stage to render the death penalty unconstitutional based not only on leg-
islative trends but also on the Court's new objective indicia of the infre-
quency of execution and general consensus abroad.424
416. Id.
417. Id. at 624. Still on the subject of foreign laws, Justice Scalia pointed to the inconsis-
tency of the Court's abortion jurisprudence because the United States is one of six countries
that retains "abortion on demand" until the fetus is viable. Id. at 625.
418. Id. at 628-29.
419. Id. at 629. The dissent also stated that the majority's decision is nothing more than
the current Justices' views of a snapshot of American public opinion. Id.
420. Roper, 543 U.S. at 630.
421. Id. at 564-65 (majority opinion). The Court observed that only six juvenile offenders
were executed since Stanford-three in the last ten years. Id.
422. See ABA Juvenile Justice Committee, available at http://www.abanet.org/
crimjust/juvjus/juvdp.html. Contra Brim, supra note 413, at 749.
423. Roger P. Alford, Roper v. Simmons and Our Constitution in International Equi-
poise, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1, 18 (2005).
424. Id. at 20.
2006]
UALR LAW REVIEW
An infuriated Alabama Supreme Court judge wrote an opinion piece in
a Birmingham newspaper in which he beseeched his colleagues to "actively
resist" the ruling and lambasted the Roper majority for its "blatant judicial
tyranny.""42 Some judges and prosecutors in Texas argued that--despite the
clear chronological-age rule-the holding would not apply in the state be-
cause its criminal law deemed all seventeen-year-olds to be adults, and the
state's death-penalty law explicitly made seventeen-year-olds death-penalty
eligible.426 Is the evolving-standards test an unprincipled method, or is it the
best way to approach Eighth Amendment claims?
B. Academic Discussion
For legal scholars and Supreme Court groupies, the decision is a great
demonstration of the Court's struggle to interpret textually vague provisions
of the Constitution. Beneath the majority and dissenting opinions in Roper
lie primarily two differing approaches to interpreting the Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments: historicism and
originalism.427 Generally, originalists address the problem of vague constitu-
tional text by considering the Framer's intentions in adopting the lan-
guage.42 An originalist adheres to the idea that a constitutional provision is
a command from the legislative body that should be properly superseded
only by that legislative body.429 In contrast, historicists address textual
vagueness by reviewing the changing social values that are relevant to the
text at issue, rejecting mere transient changes, and giving constitutional en-
dorsement to those changes that have achieved wide consensus. 4 ' The
evolving-standards test falls squarely within the latter category.
In contemporary jurisprudence, the Court interprets the provision based
on the evolving-standards test set forth in Trop.43' Justice Scalia applied the
evolving-standards principle in writing for the majority in Stanford, but
when writing for himself in Roper, he criticized the majority's use of the test
425. Stephanie Francis Ward, Judge Wants Justice Denied, Jan. 13, 2006, available at
http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/home.htnl.
426. Ellen Marrus et al., After Roper v. Simmons: Keeping Kids out of Adult Criminal
Court, 42 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 1151, 1162 (2005).
427. Heffernan, supra note 132, at 1367. Heffernan defines "historicism" as viewing the
provisions of the Constitution as enduring principles to be applied in light of historical
change and present practice. Id. at 1361. Heffernan distinguishes historicism from the advo-
cates of a "living constitution," although the two theories are obviously similar. See id. at
1369.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 1370.
430. Id. at 1367. Heffernan cited Weems and Trop as the "historicist framework" that
guides modern interpretation of the provision. Id. at 1378-80.
431. Id. at 1355, 1371-72.
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because it deviated from the original meaning.432 One must keep in mind
that the paucity of evidence regarding the Framers' intent in adopting the
provision ensures that an originalist interpretation basically endorses any
punitive practice short of torture that was common in 1791, including the
theoretical execution of seven-year-olds.43 3 Thus, the evolving-standards test
runs counter to originalism in the Eighth Amendment context because the
principle does not account for any possible devolving standards of decency
in American society and does not allow for the possible discovery of scien-
tific evidence that may be contrary to what the majority considered persua-
sive in Roper. To illustrate, Justice Scalia asked the following to Simmons's
counsel in oral argument: If new scientific evidence shows that seventeen-
year-olds are as mature as their adult counterparts, could the "constitutional
calculus ever move in the other direction? '4 34 Justice Scalia commented that
"[i]t's sort of a one-way ratchet. Isn't it?,
435
State death-penalty laws form the foundation of the evolving-standards
test. Thus, the majoritarian notion of national consensus is crucial in deter-
mining constitutionality under the test. The Roper decision's national con-
sensus fails without the support of the twelve states that ban the death pen-
alty altogether. As both dissenting opinions demonstrated, the majority's
national consensus is easily challengeable. The Roper majority itself recog-
nized this fact when it stood upon Atkins's observation that "[i]t is not so
much the number of these states that is significant, but the consistency of the
direction of change.,
4 36
The propriety of using the non-death-penalty states in the national-
consensus calculus may be a negative for the Roper decision; however, Jus-
tice Scalia-in writing for himself in Thompson and for the majority in
Stanford-used the nineteen death-penalty states that do not set minimum
ages for the juvenile death penalty as implied support for it.437 As Justice
Brennan pointed out in his Stanford dissent-like Justice Stevens in Thomp-
son-there was no evidence that these legislatures explicitly authorized the
execution of juveniles simply by the interplay between their capital statutes
and juvenile-transfer statutes.438 Consequently, if the use of the twelve non-
death-penalty states says nothing explicitly about the propriety of executing
juveniles in those states and if the use of the nineteen non-minimum-age
432. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
433. See supra Part III.B.2.
434. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-
633).
435. Id.
436. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002).
437. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 372 n.3.
438. Id. at 385 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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states says nothing affirmatively about the state legislatures' official posi-
tions on the juvenile death penalty,439 then perhaps the statistics cancel each
other out and render Roper a "premature" decision.
The problem is that the national consensus in Roper is open to chal-
lenge because of the disagreement over which states to count, and the Court
struggles to compensate for this by citing not only empirical data but also
opinion polls and foreign practice--evidence previously not found in evolv-
ing-standards cases."0 Indeed, Justice Marshall stated in Furman that opin-
ion polls are weak indicators because the interviewee is not usually making
a fully-informed opinion on the matter." 1
C. The Weaknesses of an Originalist Interpretation of the Punishments
Clause
Originalism is not a better alternative. Early in the twentieth century,
the Court rejected the originalist approach in Weems and Trop-an interpre-
tation that Furman and subsequent cases would continue to affirm decades
later. For example, in one case, Justice Scalia searched the documentary
record and discovered that some state constitutions that were adopted before
ratification of the Bill of Rights placed the phrase in the disjunctive: "nor
cruel or unusual punishments inflicted." ' In his attempt to find the most
"plausible" reading of the clause, he reasoned that the Framers must have
considered that the clause established two independent conditions by use of
the word "or."" 3 Under this reading of the clause, innovations in punishment
that minimized pain, like the electric chair in Kemmler,4" would be "un-
usual," even if not cruel.445 Thus, employing this approach, an originalist
interpretation of Kemmler may have rendered electrocution unconstitu-
tional. 446 Furthermore, there is debate in the record-from both opponents
and defenders of the phrase-that "cruel and unusual" is not a term of art,
but a vague and perhaps unnecessary phrase.447 Therefore, for Eighth
Amendment purposes, the previous example demonstrates that an originalist
439. In Roper, Justice Scalia pointed out that the states of Missouri and Virginia explic-
itly set sixteen as the minimum age after Stanford, and he also argued that Arizona and Flor-
ida essentially did the same by ballot initiative. Roper, 543 U.S. at 613-14.
440. Heffeman, supra note 132, at 1386.
441. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 361 (1972) (per curiam) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring).
442. Heffeman, supra note 132, at 1372-73 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957
(1991)).
443. Id. at 1373.
444. See supra Part III.B. 1.
445. Heffernan, supra note 132, at 1373.
446. Id. at 1375.
447. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 263 (1972) (per curiam) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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risks error in attempting to deduce plausible meanings from a complex and
inconclusive historical record that can easily be subject to a one-sided analy-
sis.
441
In his Roper dissent, Justice Scalia advocated his originalist position
and then proceeded to argue why the majority's evolving-standards test was
half baked. In addition to tolerating the theoretical execution of a seven-
year-old, an originalist resolution to the constitutional issue in Roper is
problematic for another reason. Legislative primacy is a fundamental princi-
ple of originalism, as Justice Scalia noted in his dissent.449 Indeed, Justice
Scalia addressed the "mistaken" evolving-standards jurisprudence at the
outset of his dissent.450 Thus, he would defer to Congress the moral question
of whether the juvenile death penalty is acceptable to society. Who could
argue against this patently democratic proposition in the abstract? From a
practical perspective, however, this deferral to Congress would essentially
render the juvenile-execution issue unresolved. The constitutional amend-
ment process requires a bill to be passed by both houses of Congress by a
two-thirds majority and then requires approval by three-fourths of the
states.451 Accordingly, in the context of interpreting the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments, an
originalist approach not only contemplates an absurd possibility, it also al-
lows its proponents to defer to Congress a question that would never realis-
tically be resolved through the Article V amendment process, while allow-
ing its proponents to criticize the evolving-standards alternative as unprinci-
pled. Interestingly, a constitutional amendment, if it made it to the states,
would obviously include the twelve abolition states that have caused so
much disagreement in the Court's evolving-standards jurisprudence.
Assuming that a constitutional amendment could survive both houses
of Congress, the states would ultimately decide the fate of the amendment
under Article V. The Court's evolving-standards test seems to be an attempt
to do the same thing by counting the states, except in a much more realistic
way. The standard allows the Court to decide the legal question, instead of
deferring the question to Congress in which case the issue would likely die
on a moral battlefield.
448. Heffernan,supra note 132, at 1375.
449. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
450. Id. at 608.
451. UNITED STATES CONST. art. V.
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D. The Better Approach to the Eighth Amendment: Evolving Standards
Morality452 is at the heart of the Roper decision. Not only did the Court
employ a legal standard that attempted to rest upon the moral calculations of
state legislatures, the Court also engaged in a controversial moral-
proportionality analysis of the deterrent and retributive goals of the death
penalty-an analysis that prompted Justice Scalia to criticize the majority's
role as moral arbiter for American society. Moreover, the Court looked to
foreign practices as confirmation of its decision. It is not a focus of this note
to address either of these controversial issues. As noted above, however,
perhaps less criticism of the Court's use of these other arguments would
have accrued if the evolving-standards' indicia of national consensus was
solidly against the practice. These other arguments could have played a
more supportive, rather than central, role.
But, the Court did invite controversy by attempting to decide a legal
question that was inextricably linked to a moral issue. Accordingly, the
evolving-standards test became a part of the moral controversy itself. From
a contemporary perspective, it is arguably a non-controversial assumption to
conclude that American death-penalty proponents would view the execution
of a seven-year-old murderer as unacceptable or immoral. On the other
hand, it is probably a safe assumption to conclude that it would be unaccept-
able to take the death penalty off the table for an eighteen-year-old capital
murderer. Logically, then, the answer must be somewhere in the middle.
This middle-ground is the realm of the evolving-standards test, while an
originalist interpretation remains frozen in 1791.
The question remains as follows: which states should be counted in the
evolving-standards analysis besides the eighteen states that set a minimum
age for execution? The answer depends on the inclusion or exclusion of the
twelve abolition states. Roper marked the first time that the Court used the
twelve abolition states in the calculation as opposition to the practice. Either
the dissent in Roper is right-that these abolition states shed no light on the
propriety of the juvenile death penalty-or the majority is right in conclud-
ing that juveniles are included within the general ban of capital punishment
in these states. Whether it is the Court that interprets a constitutional provi-
sion or Congress that amends the Constitution, the latter process would
count all of the states in the Article V vote, so perhaps it does make sense to
include the abolition states in the tally.
The Supreme Court created the evolving-standards test to interpret the
Eighth Amendment's vague constitutional language, which becomes in-
452. "Morality" has been defined as "[tihe quality of being in accord with standards of
right or good conduct." AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY 814 (2d College ed. 1985) (emphasis
added).
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creasingly abstract as our Nation grows and society's conceptions of crimi-
nal punishment change. In the Eighth Amendment context, the evolving-
standards test is simply a more realistic alternative to an original meaning
interpretation and its premise of legislative primacy.
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